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THE ISSUE OF CONSENT IN BIO-MEDICALLY 
ASSISTED REPRODUCTION PROCEDURES
(THE CASE OF “EVANS V. THE UNITED KINGDOM”)




The article deals with medical law problems that can occur in the ﬁ eld of 
medical treatment of sub-fertility and infertility. As illustrated by a speciﬁ c case, 
decided by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg (Evans v. the 
United Kingdom), assisted procreation involves a number of moral, ethical and 
consequently legal dilemmas. Since the introduction of the modern in vitro fer-
tilization procedures that allow extra-corporal fertilization and the preservation 
of embryos for the future implantation, the question arises concerning the time of 
completed fertilization for such an embryo. Is it the time when fertilization in vitro 
is ﬁ nished, or the time when embryo that was fertilized in vitro is implanted into 
the woman’s body? The answer to this question is decisive in cases when a couple, 
after the preservation of their embryos, divorce (separate) or do not agree on the 
question of the implementation of an embryo(s) into the wife’s (partner’s) body. 
Key words: medical law, freedom of decision on childbirth, right to reproduce, 
bio-medically assisted procreation, informed consent, withdrawal of consent, di-
vorce, legal and ethical status of embryo.
1. INTRODUCTION
We have recently been witness to rapid developments of science and scientiﬁ c 
developments in numerous areas of human activities. A day hardly passes by 
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without us learning about a new invention that will either facilitate our life, 
or make it more difﬁ cult, at least for the traditionalists among us, depending 
on individual attitudes. The scientiﬁ c ﬁ elds that stand out in several ways in 
this regard deﬁ nitely include biomedicine. Biomedicine has made an enormous 
progress lately, which was completely unimaginable even a few decades ago. 
We can only guess how far the new discoveries in this ﬁ eld will take us. Could 
we soon become immortal or at least get close to that goal? Will we soon be 
able to prolong and maintain the quality of our life with the aid of new vital 
organs, which will replace the ailing and degenerated ones and will be provided 
by our cloned duplicate or will be grown in a laboratory from the omnipotent 
stem cells? Has man already been successfully cloned, following the success in 
cloning Dolly the sheep? 
A lawyer obviously cannot answer the above mentioned and many other 
similar questions. Reading papers and different literature in the ﬁ eld also 
makes one wonder whether scientists themselves know the answers to such 
questions. We have frequently witnessed events when a publication describing 
revolutionary discoveries in the ﬁ eld was rejected; sometimes the sources which 
report such news are unreliable or do not provide scientiﬁ c veriﬁ cation.1 It is 
undoubtedly true that the development of biomedical science is very interesting 
for the general public, mainly because its ﬁ ndings cut deep and directly into 
the essence of humankind, its most intimate spheres, such as life and health, 
physical and mental integrity, reproductive freedom, right to privacy, personal 
dignity and identity of every individual. 
2. LEGISLATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF SLOVENIA 
The issue I will present in this paper is that of bio-medically assisted procrea-
tion procedure (hereinafter: BMAPP2) and is based on the freedom of decision 
1 Statements on cloned children have been distributed several years ago to various media 
by the Raelian religious community and their infertility expert Brigitte Boisselier (presi-
dent of the Clonaid company), as well as the infamous Italian gynaecologist Severino 
Antinori. 
2 It is a term that has become commonplace in the ﬁ eld of reproductive medicine. It has to 
be stressed that not only medicine but also biology contributes to the success of proce-
dures in the ﬁ eld. This is why we no longer use the term “medically assisted procreation” 
but “bio-medically assisted procreation”. 
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on childbirth. The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia3 states in Article 
55 that deciding on the birth of one’s own children is free4 and that the state 
has to guarantee the possibilities for exercising this freedom and provide for 
the conditions to enable the parents to decide to have children. In line with 
the authentic interpretation by the Constitutional Commission the following 
rights are derived from this freedom: the right to discover and treat reduced 
fertility or infertility, the right to prevent conception and the right to artiﬁ cial 
abortion for women.5 
2.1. The right to discover and treat reduced fertility or infertility 
Because the right to discovery and treatment of reduced fertility or infertility 
cannot be ensured in any other way than with the help of the health service, 
the state is obliged to provide for its functioning. The state is also obliged to 
pass adequate legislation which lays down in detail the manner of exercising 
this constitutional right. 
By the year of 2000, all the questions from the ﬁ eld of health measures 
in guaranteeing the right to free decision-making on bearing children in the 
Republic of Slovenia were governed by the Health Measures in Exercising 
Freedom of Choice in Childbearing Act.6 In 2000, a new act was passed solely 
in the ﬁ eld of discovering and treating infertility. This Act derogated from the 
3 OG RS NOs 33I/1991-I, 42/1997, 66/2000, 24/2003, 69/2004, 69/2004, 69/2004, 
68/2006.
4 Seen from the viewpoint of the topic of the paper ∑ infertility and medical measures to 
treat it - it is rather unacceptable that the Constitution speaks of “his/her own” children. 
As the Constitution refers to the freedom of choice, a question can be posited whether 
a human who cannot be a (genetic) parent due to infertility, can at all have the right to 
have a child with the aid of donated reproductive cells. To be sure, it has to be taken into 
consideration that the aim of this constitutional provision is to enable the fulﬁ lment of a 
person’s desire to have a child. This does not necessary entail genetic parenthood; social 
parenthood can achieve the same purpose. 
5 See Draft of the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (annex), explanation of Article 
55 of the Constitution by the constitutional commission, PoroËevalec skupπËine RS, No 
1/92, 17 January 1992, p 23. On the latter rights see ZupanËiË, K., Pravna ureditev pre-
kinitve noseËnosti (Legal Provisions on Pregnancy Termination), in: Polajnar PavËnik A., 
(ed), Wedam LukiÊ D., (ed), Pravo in medicina, Cankarjeva zaloæba, 1989, p 195 - 214. 
6 OG SRS No 11/1977, 42/1986, OG RS No 29/1995, 70/2000. 
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relevant provisions of the above mentioned Act. The other two rights, which 
are derived from the constitutional freedom, are still governed by the old Act. 
The new Act, which was in a relatively short time since its adoption already 
submitted to a referendum and an intensive general public debate,7 is entitled 
the Infertility Treatment and Procedures of Biomedically-Assisted Procreation 
Act (hereinafter: the Act).8 
2.1.1. Core provisions of the Act
The Act ﬁ rst regulates the treatment of infertility. It deals with procedures 
to determine the causes of infertility or reduced fertility and the elimination of 
such causes by professional counselling, medications and surgery. According to 
the Act, treatment also includes the removal and preservation of reproductive 
cells of men and women facing the possibility of becoming infertile. The Act 
does not include more detailed provisions on treatment, because this is neither 
possible nor required. The issue is about expert medical questions which are 
governed by deontological principles. 
Types of bio-medically assisted procreation procedures are based on the 
deﬁ nition of infertility treatment. The Act deﬁ nes the BMAPP as the imple-
mentation of biomedical procedures that lead to pregnancy in ways other than 
having sexual intercourse. The BMAPP mainly include: fertilisation outside 
of a woman’s body, i.e. the introduction of sperm cells into a woman’s repro-
ductive organs and the introduction of egg cells together with sperm cells into 
a woman’s reproductive organs; and in-vitro fertilisation, which involves the 
joining of egg and sperm cells outside a woman’s body (in a glass container) 
and the introduction of fertilised egg cells or embryos in the early stage of 
development into the reproductive organs of a woman. The list of procedures 
is not exhaustive, which is indicated by the use of “mainly”. This means that 
the Act does not exclude other procedures that are being or will be developed 
7 For more detail see ÆnidarπiË V., Oploditev z biomedicinsko pomoËjo (Assisted Repro-
duction), Pravna praksa, year 20, No 18, p 9 ∑ 11 and ZupanËiË V. K., SpoËetje z bio-
medicinsko pomoËjo in pravo (Assisted Conception and the Law), Pravna praksa, year 
20, No, 18, p 5 ∑ 9 and ZupanËiË, K., Zanemarjeni otrok: spoËetje z biomedicinskimi 
postopki in pravo (Neglected Child: Assisted Conception and the Law), Delo, 26 May 
2001, year 43, No 119, p 14 ∑ 15. 
8 OG RS No 70/2000.
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by biomedical science if it considers them acceptable. All BMAPP can only be 
carried out in order to achieve pregnancy and give birth to a child and for no 
other purposes. 
The Act introduces the principle that an infertile couple must ﬁ rst undergo 
classical infertility treatment methods; i.e. counselling, medications and surgical 
procedures. Only if these prove inadequate, can BMAPP be used. BMAPP are 
usually homologous, meaning that reproductive cells of the couple undergoing 
treatment are used. Only in exceptional cases, when ﬁ ndings of the medical 
science and practice show beyond doubt that homologous procedure would 
not be successful for an individual couple, the s. c. heterologous BMAPP can 
be used. This is a procedure where a reproductive cell by a donor of either sex 
can be used. The latter is exceptionally allowed in cases of an extremely severe 
hereditary disease. 
Donorship is not solely limited to man in the Republic of Slovenia (as it 
is in several European legislations, such as Austria, Germany and Norway9). 
This is mainly so because donating an egg cell is the only possible way to allow 
an infertile woman to give birth to a desired child. On the other hand (with 
the same BMAPP) the use of both ∑ the sperm cells and the egg cells from the 
donors at the same time ∑ is prohibited. It is also forbidden to use a donated 
embryo, i.e. to implant an embryo into a woman’s body that was created from 
the reproductive cells of the male and female donors (in relation to the woman 
who will get the implanted embryo). The assisted reproduction procedure in 
such a way ensures that the child is a genetic offspring of at least one partner 
in the couple undergoing treatment. It is moreover forbidden to use a mixture 
of female and male reproductive cells as this does not follow nature; a child’s 
(genetic) father or mother are unknown and no data are available that would 
be important for the health of the child which could be provided in case of 
medical necessity.
Only heterosexual couples are entitled to use BMAPP: a woman and a man 
who are married to each other or are cohabiting.10 The Act provides for com-
9 For more detail refer to ÆnidarπiË, V., Oploditev z biomedicinsko pomoËjo, Primerjal-
nopravni prikaz, mednarodnopravni akti, (Assisted Reproduction in Comparative Law, 
International Acts), in: Polajnar PavËnik A., (ed), Wedam LukiÊ D., (ed), Pravo in me-
dicina, Cankarjeva zaloæba, 1989, p 215 ∑ 226.
10 Cohabitation should not only be dealt with in the sense of the descriptive deﬁ nition 
from Article 12 of the Marriage and Family Relations Act, OG RS No 69/2004-UPB1, 
101/2007, 122/2007. Assistance should also be given to a woman and man who claim 
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plete anonymity of donors of reproductive cells, in general as in the relation to 
children. 11 The child thus cannot learn the identity of the male or female donor 
and is only entitled to learn such data about the donor that are important for 
his/her health (to diagnose a child’s disease, for treatment). Such data are avail-
able for health reasons if the child is capable of judgement and at least 15 years 
old.12 The Act allows the medical professionals and other professionals in the 
ﬁ eld of assisted reproduction to object and not cooperate in those procedures 
from conscientious reasons: the professional personnel are not under obligation 
to carry out BMAPP or take part in them. The Act expressly prohibits assisted 
to be living in cohabitation. Such an assurance should prove enough for the doctor from 
whom it cannot be expected to try and see whether the couple is telling the truth. A very 
important indicator is that a man wants to have a baby with the woman and has carried 
out all the necessary tests and medical procedures with the woman and went through 
unsuccessful (and usually long-lasting) treatment. BMAPP as a rule should not be car-
ried out prior to the completion of such procedures.
11 There are various views on whether a child should be told about the identity of his real 
(genetic) parents. If an Act would allow a child conceived through assisted reproduction 
procedures to be told about the identity of his/her genetic parents (the donor of the 
sperm or ovary cell), the genetic parents, who had no desire to establish a parenting at-
titude at conception and live their own personal and family lives where there is no space 
for this child, could be placed in an awkward position. Social parents who were given a 
chance to get a child through donorship (exercise of the right to free decision-making on 
childbirth!) can demand the child to be theirs alone on the basis of their right to privacy 
and family life. By uncovering the donor the relation between the child and the social 
parents could be disturbed, which is not in the child’s interest. On the other hand, the 
opposite view (that the child should be told about the identity of the sperm or ovary cell 
donor) is based on the child’s right to personal dignity (Article 24 of the Slovenian Con-
stitution) as the basis of the child’s right to personal identity, necessary for development 
and formation of the child’s personality. The child who does not have the chance to be 
told the identity of his genetic parents is claimed to be experiencing identity crises, and 
be discriminated with regard to other children. Moreover, there is a chance that a child 
could marry a close relative.
12 In 2005 The United Kingdom switched from a system that guaranteed anonymity of the 
reproductive cells donors to a system which allows children to learn of the identity of the 
donor under certain conditions. For more detailed treatment refer to: http://www.hfea.gov.
uk/en, 25 March 2008. Also refer to Kirilova Eriksson M., Reproductive Freedom In the 
Context of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, The Hague, 2000, p 199 ∑ 201 and Robertson J. A., Embryos, Families and Procreative 
Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, v: Steinbock, B., (ed.), Legal and 
Ethical Issues in Human Reproduction, Ashgate, Darthmouth, 2001, p 79 ∑ 82. 
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reproduction procedures for the purpose of realisation of the agreements on 
surrogate motherhood.13 
3. CONSENSUS FOR THE ASSISTED REPRODUCTION PROCEDURE 
The issue of consensus for the BMAPP is expressly laid down in the Act.14 
The Act states that the procedure can only be carried out on the basis of a 
written consent by the spouses or cohabiting partners. Before the spouses or 
cohabiting partners consent to the BMAPP in writing, the doctor must explain 
the procedure, the success rate, potential consequences and hazards of the 
procedure for the woman, man and child. The doctor also has to counsel and 
inform the couple of the reasons for which their personal data will be collected 
and processed and explain that data are protected as a professional secret. If 
necessary, the doctor directs the spouses or cohabiting partners to a psychologi-
cal-social counselling on the planed BMAPP.
The doctor must also explain the rules on the preservation of reproductive 
cells and embryos to the spouses or cohabiting partners as well as ask about 
their wishes regarding the duration of the preservation and their decisions on 
possible unused embryos. The doctor must present other possibilities to the 
spouses or cohabiting partners which could solve or bypass the reason for their 
infertility, including such methods that are not used by the doctor’s medical 
facility. The doctor must mention non-medical choices such as adoption or 
abandoning the treatment. The written consent must be provided by the spouses 
or cohabiting partners for every individual BMAPP. 
I will deal here with the issue of consent, which is encountered in the area 
of assisted reproduction when dealing with BMAPP that involve the s. c. stored 
13 The notion of “surrogate motherhood” in its broadest sense includes all cases in which 
a woman binds herself by a contract to bear and give birth to a child against payment 
or for free and to deliver a child for good to the contracting party after birth. For more 
detailed treatment refer to ÆnidarπiË, V., Surogatno materinstvo ∑ pravni (in etiËni) vidik 
oploditve z biomedicinsko pomoËjo, (Surrogate Motherhood: Legal (and Ethical) As-
pects of Assisted Reproduction) in: Lobnikar, B., (ed), Æurej, J., (ed), Raziskovalno delo 
podiplomskih πtudentov Slovenije, Druæboslovje in humanistika, Ljubljana, Druπtvo 
mladih raziskovalcev Slovenije, 2000, p 45 ∑ 55. 
14 For a comparative law review refer to De Cruz P., Comparative Healthcare Law, Caven-
dish Publishing, London, 2001, p 323 ∑ 356. 
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embryos. These are embryos that were not implanted into the woman’s body 
after fertilisation but rather stored for possible future needs, either because of 
the possibility of an unsuccessful BMAPP or subsequently expressed desire by 
the couple for another child. 
According to the Slovenian legislation early embryos must be stored by spe-
cially certiﬁ ed BMAPP centres. The centres must abide by current discoveries 
of the medical science and established medical practice. The embryos are kept 
for the time that is speciﬁ ed by the woman and man undergoing BMAPP, for 
a period not exceeding ﬁ ve years. If the spouses or cohabiting partners cannot 
agree on the time of keeping, the decision is made by the national BMAPP 
commission. After the above mentioned deadlines expire, the embryos must be 
left to die. Embryos in their early stage are not on disposal either of the per-
sons from whom they originate or other persons. The centre for BMAPP must 
not hand them out to anyone. The Act also prevents agency from collecting, 
keeping and using embryos in the early stages of development. Trading with 
embryos is strictly prohibited.
We will now present a concrete case-law example and focus on the issue of 
what happens if one of the spouses does not want the embryos to be kept while 
the other insists that this be done, or what happens if a woman demands that 
a preserved (frozen) embryo is implanted despite her husband’s or partner’s 
disapproval. 
3.1. Evans v. the United Kingdom
The case has made headlines in England as well as in the world. Evans v. the 
United Kingdom case was decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg. The case revolved around the issue of keeping frozen embryos in 
cases when the partners separate or divorce and there is no longer the consensus 
for continuing the BMAPP and also not for the implantation of the embryo(s) 
into the woman’s (ex wife’s, ex partner’s) body. 
The facts of the case are as follows:15 In 2000 the Evanses began infertility treat-
ment at a clinic in the United Kingdom. Health checks have found Mrs. Evans to 
15 Summary taken from the ruling in the Case of Evans v. The United Kingdom, dated 7 
March 2006, published at EURO IUS-INFO, European Court of Human Rights, http://
www.ius-software.si, 29 March 2008. 
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be inﬂ icted with pre-cancerous formations on both ovaries so the doctors proposed 
that egg cells be extracted, Mrs. Evans to be operated on and later a BMAPP would 
be executed with the fertilised egg cells or the embryo that would develop from 
them. Freezing the egg cells and sperm cells separately was not possible. When the 
clinic informed the couple on the course of the BMAPP, it also stated that both 
partners have the right to withdraw consent at any time prior to the embryo being 
implanted into Mrs. Evans’s body. Mr. Evans consented in writing to freezing the 
embryos thus created for a period of ten years, even in the case of his death or loss 
of capability of discernment. 
Mrs. Evans’s egg cells were extracted during the procedure, fertilised with 
Mr. Evans’s sperm and six embryos had formed which were then frozen. The 
wife then undertook treatment where her ovaries were removed. The couple 
was told that they could continue with the BMAPP only two years after the 
completed surgery. But this did not happen as the couple divorced after two 
years and Mr. Evans withdrew his consent for the procedure to continue. 
In line with the English legislation in the ﬁ eld, the Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Act 1990,16 the clinic should have destroyed the embryos, but Mrs. 
Evans sued her husband to restore his previous consent. She was unsuccessful 
at all stages of the court proceedings in the UK as the courts kept stressing that 
the aim of the English act was to ensure a continuous consent by both part-
ners ∑ from the start of the treatment to the moment the embryo is implanted 
into the body. Mrs. Evans then ﬁ led a suit on the European Court of Human 
Rights in Strasbourg. She built her case mainly on the following human rights 
and freedoms: 
a) Frozen embryos have the right to life protected by law (Article 2 of the Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms17 (hereinafter: the Convention);
b) English legislation, which in such cases states that the frozen embryos should 
be destroyed, is contrary to the right to respect for private and family life 
(Article 8 of the Convention);
c) Such legislation goes against the principle of prohibition of discrimination 
(Article 14 of the Convention).
16 Refer to http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts1990, 28 March 2008. 
17 European Convention on Human Rights, refer to OG RS (13 June 1994) MP, No 7 ∑ 
41/1994 (RS 33/1994). 
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The court in Strasbourg also decided against the plaintiff and ruled that the 
English legislation did not contravene the said human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. 
The court based its ruling on the following main reasons: 
a) The court ruled that there was no violation of Article 2 of the Convention as in 
the absence of consensus on when human life begins the issue of when the right 
to life begins comes under the auspices of national legislations (also in the case 
of abortion). The English law does not protect the right to life of an embryo.
b) Regarding the violation of the right to private and family life, the court 
stressed that the phrase “the right to privacy and family life” is a very broad 
notion; an individual’s “private life” includes, inter alia, different aspects of 
an individual’s physical and mental identity, together with the individual’s 
right to autonomy, personal development and establishment and develop-
ment of relationships with other people; this also includes the right of both 
partners to freely decide on whether to have or not to have children.” 
c) The court failed to share the plaintiff ’s view that a woman with fertility 
problems who is dependent on the aid of doctors (through IVF) was discrimi-
nated against if compared with a woman who can get pregnant by sexual 
intercourse; Mrs. Evans on the other hand stated that she (and women in 
a similar position) depended on the donor of the seed who can prevent the 
embryo to be implanted, while a woman, who conceived in the normal way, 
once the fertilisation took place, can freely decide on her fate and the fate 
of the child; the court ascertained that such differentiation was underlined 
by objective facts in the said case. 
The court was of the opinion that provision of Article 8 of the Convention 
gives the right to respect decisions of both parties, one that wants to be a par-
ent and the other that does not. Because there is no international consensus 
regarding the use of BMAPP and legislations in individual countries differ to a 
large extent, the court ruled that individual states hold discretion rights regard-
ing the legislation in this area. The United Kingdom regulated the issue in the 
way it did18 and nothing would be amiss if it regulated it differently. The court 
also emphasised the fact that both parties were informed of the way in which 
consent could be withdrawn before starting the BMAPP.19 
18 See also Grubb, A., (ed), Principles of Medical Law, Second Edition, Oxford University 
Press, 2004, p 700. 
19 In more detail in Wicks, E., Human Rights and Healthcare, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 
2007, p 167 ∑ 169. 
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Regardless of the ruling, I feel it is proper to point to dissenting opinions, 
written by two judges, who disagreed with the ruling stating that there was no 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the case. 
While the two dissenters agreed that both the man and the woman hold 
independent rights to free decision-making regarding their reproduction, the 
case in point shows that the absolute power of a man to withdraw consent 
takes away the woman’s autonomy in deciding on her genetic material. The two 
judges said that the state should provide for exceptions from the clearly stated 
rule in such exceptional cases. Such rules are unable to consider the speciﬁ c 
social and psychological aspects in concrete cases, which is what prompted the 
judges to declare the need for a speciﬁ c approach in this type of special cases. 
A very careful weighing of rights is necessary: while the woman is deprived 
of any chance to give birth to her own child, the man still has the chance to 
satisfy his need for fatherhood. 
The judges believe that the correct approach would be the following: the 
interests of the party who withdraws consent for BMAPP and wants to have the 
embryos destroyed should prevail unless the other party has no other means to 
have a genetically-related child and has no children at all and does not intend 
to have recourse to a surrogate mother in the process of implantation. 
Such an approach would, the two judges said, strike a fair balance between 
public and private interests, as well as between conﬂ icting individual rights 
themselves. 
Following the plaintiff ’s request, the Evans case was also decided by the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights. The decision to 
send the case to the Grand Chamber was taken by ﬁ ve judges of the Grand 
Chamber who decided on the basis of Article 43 of the Convention that this 
was an important issue regarding the interpretation or use of the Convention 
and this was also an issue of general importance. The Grand Chamber passed 
its ruling on 10 April 2007, which ran largely along the same lines as the court’s 
ﬁ rst ruling.20 I would like to stress that the judges were unanimous in deciding 
that there was no violation of Article 2 of the Convention and ruled with 13 
votes to 4 that no violation of articles 8 and 14 of the Convention took place. 
Three judges meanwhile wrote their joint dissenting opinion.21 
20 Refer to Case of Evans v. The United Kingdom from 10 April 2007, published at EURO 
IUS-INFO, European Court of Human Rights, http://www.ius-software.si, 29 March 2008.
21 For more details refer to the quoted ruling, p 18 ∑ 20. 
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3.1.1. Commentary to the Evans case 
The dilemma, triggered by “Evans v. the United Kingdom” is quite extensive 
and complex. We can say it has been present ever since the option of in-vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) was presented in connection with possibility of freezing of 
the embryos. This is where the discrepancy between the situation at the time of 
the fertilisation and the situation that exists at the moment of implantation into 
the woman’s body appeared. Meanwhile, as the above mentioned case shows, 
a couple can separate, a partner can die or merely withdraw his/her consent, 
etc. The woman could die as well, which could pose the question of whether 
the embryo could be implanted into the body of another woman. 
Some believe that open dilemmas merely concern the question of whether 
IVF is treated as a single or a dual act. According to the single act interpreta-
tion, the fertilisation procedure is completed when an embryo is implanted into 
the woman’s body. On the other hand, according to the dual act interpretation 
there are two phases in the procedure: the IVF is performed ﬁ rst and then the 
resulting embryo is inserted into the woman’s body in phase two. 
The ﬁ rst interpretation says that IVF is only completed with the implantation 
of the fertilised egg, meaning that the BMAPP cannot be carried out if mar-
riage was terminated or the consent was withdrawn prior to that. The second 
interpretation meanwhile holds that fertilisation has already been completed 
during the marriage (when the consent was still in place) and the implantation 
is merely the realisation of the performed fertilisation. 
Despite the existence of many different positions on the question, we can see 
that theory and case-law are more in favour of taking a stricter position in such 
cases. If we compare IVF procedures to normal ways of getting pregnant (and 
the aim is to make such procedures resemble the normal ones to the greatest 
extent possible), we can see that there is no dual act there. It is true, however, 
that the provision on the possibility of withdrawing consent loses some of its 
weight if it cannot be exercised when fertilisation occurred, but implantation 
was not carried out. 
Comparative law deals with this question in very different ways.22 Legisla-
tion in Denmark, France, the Netherlands, Greece and Switzerland expressly 
state the partner’s right to withdraw consent at any time before the embryo is 
implanted into the woman’s body. Similar practice is also carried out in Ger-
many, Belgium, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 
22 For a comparative law review refer to the above-quoted ruling, dated 7 March 2006. 
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Hungary employs a different solution, where in such a case a woman can 
proceed with a BMAPP regardless of divorce or her husband’s death, unless the 
couple has agreed otherwise in writing. The husband’s consent to BMAPP can 
only be revoked up to the fertilisation in Austria, Estonia and Italy, allowing 
the woman to freely decide on her course of action after that.23 
The USA does not have a federal law governing the issue. Since only a few 
states have introduced laws concerning this issue, it has been left to courts to 
determine how the issue should be resolved. On a case-by-case basis, the courts 
took different positions. It seems, however, that the position that the will of 
the person who does not want to become a parent prevails. A court in the state 
of Massachusetts ruled in the AZ v. BZ case24 that the agreement, concluded 
between the spouses that leaned towards giving the wife the right to the embryos 
in case of divorce should not be enforced if opposed later by the husband. The 
so-called forced procreation is not a ﬁ eld amenable to judicial enforcement, or, 
as we would put it, this is not a right that could be freely disposed of in such 
a way. The freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life 
should always prevail. 
The Israeli Supreme Court accepted also an interesting ruling in the Nach-
mani v Nachmani,25 case, when a childless Israeli couple decided to undergo 
IVF and later enter into a contract with a surrogate mother, because the wife’s 
health was impaired to such a degree that she was not be able to carry and de-
liver a child. The couple separated after the embryo was frozen and before the 
surrogate mother in California was contracted. The husband began to oppose 
the use of the embryos as he had found another woman and was expecting a 
child with her. The wife, however, wanted to go on with the procedure. The 
Israeli Supreme Court decided, with seven votes to four, in favour of the wife. 
Each of the judges wrote a separate opinion. The majority of judges stated that 
the woman’s interests, the desire to have a child and in particular her lack of 
alternatives to achieve genetic parenthood outweighed those of the husband 
who did not want to be a father. 
23 For a more detailed overview of individual national legislations dealing with assisted 
reproduction, see also Meulders ∑ Klein, M. T., Deech, R., Vlaardingerbroek, P., (ed), 
Biomedicine, the Family and Human Rights, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 
2002, pp. 479 ∑ 578. 
24 Ibidem. 
25 Ibidem. 
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4. CONCLUSION 
We can ﬁ nally ask the question of what a Slovenian court would decide if 
faced with such a case. Considering the valid Infertility Treatment and Proce-
dures of Biomedically-Assisted Procreation Act, the ruling would not present 
signiﬁ cant legally-technical problems. The Act expressly states in Article 23 
that either of the spouses or cohabiting partners can withdraw consent or 
renounce BMAPP until the sperm, eggs cells or embryos are implanted into 
a woman’s body. The centre must write down the revoking decision and issue 
a certiﬁ cate if asked to do so by one of the spouses of cohabiting partners. 
The doctor must make sure that consent is not revoked before implanting 
the embryos. 
I believe that such a solution is correct and wise as it prevents a wide 
range of dilemmas and second thoughts triggered by the so-called “forced 
procreation”. The above mentioned forceful nature of procreation is clearly 
stated by Mr. Johnston Evans, the defendant in the presented Evans case, 
who said that if the events had taken a different course and the man had a 
testicle surgery that would render him infertile, nobody could force a woman 
to have an embryo implanted, carry the foetus to term and deliver a child. 
In such a case, he said, gender equality should apply and they should not be 
treated differently. 
I am convinced that the situation of a man and woman cannot be completely 
equalled in all segments of reproductive freedom. This is why I have to agree 
with the decision of the European Court of Human Rights as a lawyer, although 
maybe with a heavy heart as a human being. The decision is cruel regarding its 
consequences ∑ i.e. that Mrs Evans will never be able to have a genetic offspring 
- but in my view it is the only correct and legally founded one. If we crossed the 
boundary of what we deﬁ ne as free and informed consent to a certain medical 
procedure, especially in cases with such far-reaching consequences as a birth 
of a new child, we would create a very dangerous precedent. 
The arguments of the dissenting judges are easily understandable if ob-
served through the prism of humanity, but do not stand against a founded 
legal evaluation. One of the arguments, presented by the proponents of “full” 
equality between man and women as regards their reproductive rights, is that 
the presented solution goes against the fact that a man cannot prevent the child 
from being born in cases of normal (unassisted) conception. The argument is 
of course out of place and it is a classic case of simplifying complex issues. The 
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reason why a man cannot prevent the child from being born if conceived in a 
natural way (through sexual intercourse) is that such an act would mean an 
encroachment into the bodily integrity of a woman in the form of an abortion. 
It does not mean that men have less rights women regarding the decision on a 
future child or reproductive freedom, it only takes into consideration the simple 
biological fact that a future child or an embryo develops inside its mother’s 
body. This gives the woman a certain priority in exercising her own rights in 
comparison with those of the father. 
In cases of BMAPP, this imbalance in exercising reproductive rights is di-
minished.26 This is why I believe that in such cases the exercise of procreative 
rights of man and woman should be as balanced as possible. To be sure, this can 
only be achieved up to a point when this is possible, i.e. up to the implantation 
of the embryo into the woman’s body. 
In the Evans case the European Court of Human Rights made a difﬁ cult 
decision, balancing extremely important and highly protected interests. I believe 
that it made the right decision by supporting the basic principle of providing 
(informed) consent for any medical procedure. 
Saæetak
Viktorija ÆnidarπiË Skubic *
PITANJE SUGLASNOSTI U POSTUPCIMA 
BIOMEDICINSKI POMOGNUTE OPLODNJE 
(PREDMET “EVANS v. UJEDINJENO KRALJEVSTVO”)
U posljednje smo vrijeme suoËeni s brzim razvojem znanosti i sa znanstvenim 
otkriÊima, meu ostalim, i na podruËju biomedicinske znanosti. Najnovije tehnike i 
postupci na podruËju medicinski potpomognute oplodnje obeÊavaju gotovo nemoguÊe, 
primjerice, jamËe da uz pomoÊ kloniranja svatko moæe postati bioloπki roditelj svojoj 
*  Dr. sc. Viktorija ÆnidarπiË Skubic, docentica Pravnog fakulteta SveuËiliπta u Ljubljani, 
Poljanski nasip 2, Ljubljana
26 Compare to Wicks, E., Human Rights and Healthcare, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2007, 
p 169. 
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æeljenoj djeci. Nekada nepojmljiv razvoj s druge strane donosi i mnoπtvo dvojbi i ot-
vorenih pitanja. Moramo biti svjesni, povijest bi nam pri tome morala sluæiti kao dobra 
uËiteljica, da samo znanstveni napredak, bez moralne i etiËke osnove, ne donosi nuæno 
samo dobre i korisne rezultate. Suprotno, uz odreene uvjete, moæe se preinaËiti Ëak u 
πtetnu praksu, koja u traæenju uvijek novih znanstvenih otkriÊa krπi Ëovjekova temeljna 
ljudska prava i slobode. 
Na podruËju tzv. prokreativne slobode, koje poseban aspekt, utvrivanje i lijeËenje 
neplodnosti i smanjenje plodnosti, je predmet ove rasprave, moralna i etiËka pravila moraju 
biti joπ u toliko veÊoj mjeri saveznik i suputnik svih suradnika u tim postupcima. Navedeni 
su postupci umnogome posebni zbog Ëinjenice roenja djeteta, dakle novoga ljudskog biÊa. 
Njegovo se roenje ne dogaa prirodnim putem, nego pomoÊu razliËitih biomedicinskih 
metoda. Zakonodavac se treba zalagati za to da se moralno-etiËko i konzekventno i pravno 
osjetljivo podruËje regulira na takav naËin da se napredak znanosti i tehnologije zrcali 
u pozitivnom doprinosu ËovjeËanstvu. 
Dvojba, na koju upozoravam u ovom djelu, odnosi se na biomedicinski potpomognutu 
oplodnju. Posebice su problematiËni postupci koji omoguÊuju oplodnju izvan ljudskog tijela, 
tzv. IVF postupci. PomoÊu tih postupka uvelike se poveÊava uspjeπnost, a posljedica toga 
je raanje veÊeg broja æeljene djece. Istodobno, te tehnike otvaraju mnoga teπka pitanja: 
na primjer koliko embrija smijemo kreirati izvan majËina tijela? Moramo li sve tako 
nastale embrije unijeti u majËino tijelo ili ih moæemo saËuvati (zamrznuti) za kasniju 
upotrebu? ©to Ëiniti ako embriji, iz razliËitih razloga, poslije ne mogu biti upotrijebljeni? 
Smijemo li ih darivati drugome paru, trebaju li sluæiti za znanstvena istraæivanja ili ih 
trebamo pustiti umrijeti? To su samo neka od mnoπtva pitanja koja zakonodavac mora 
rijeπiti na tome podruËju. U ovom djelu je, na temelju posebnog primjera iz engleske sud-
ske prakse, koja je dobila epilog i na Europskom sudu za ljudska prava u Strassbourgu, 
predstavljena dvojba ∑ πto uËiniti kada se partneri, koji imaju u postupku IVF pohranjene 
embrije, o provoenju medicinski potpomognute oplodnje viπe ne usuglaπavaju? »ije pravo 
prevlada? Pravo muπkoga, Ëije su spolne stanice bile upotrijebljene za oplodnju izvan 
majËina tijela, koji ne æeli dijete i odriËe se suglasnosti za zavrπetak postupka, odnosno 
unosa pohranjenog embrija u tijelo æene, ili pravo æene, koja æeli imati dijete i konkretan 
je postupak za nju jedini moguÊi naËin da postane bioloπki roditelj? Primjer “Evans v The 
United Kingdom” donosi s moralno-etiËkog stajaliπta moæda teπko prihvatljivo rjeπenje, 
a istodobno jedino pravno pravilno. 
KljuËne rijeËi: medicinsko pravo, sloboda odluËivanja o raanju djece, pravo na 
reprodukciju, biomedicinski potpomognuta oplodnja, informirana suglasnost, povlaËenje 
suglasnosti, razvod braka, pravni i etiËki status embrija. 
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Zusammenfassung
Viktorija ÆnidarπiË Skubic **
DIE ZUSTIMMUNGSFRAGE BEI BIOMEDIZINISCH 
ASSISTIERTEN REPRODUKTIONSVERFAHREN 
(DER FALL “EVANS GEGEN DAS VEREINIGTE KÖNIGREICH”)
In letzter Zeit sehen wir uns einer sprunghaften Entwicklung von Forschung und wis-
senschaftlichen Entdeckungen gegenüber, unter anderem im Bereich der biomedizinischen 
Wissenschaft. Die neuesten technischen Verfahren im Bereich der medizinisch assistierten 
Befruchtung versprechen das nahezu Unmögliche, dass nämlich mit Hilfe der Klontechnik 
praktisch jedermann biologischer Vater oder Mutter seines Wunschkindes werden kann. 
Diese einst unvorstellbare Entwicklung bringt andererseits eine Vielzahl von Dilemmata 
und offenen Fragen mit sich. Wir sollten uns dessen bewusst sein, dass der reine wis-
senschaftliche Fortschritt ohne moralische und ethische Grundlagen nicht zwangsläuﬁ g 
gute und nützliche Ergebnisse zeitigt, wobei uns die Geschichte eine gute Lehrerin sein 
kann. Er kann sich sogar ganz gegensätzlich unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen in eine 
schadvolle Praxis verwandeln, die auf der ständigen Suche nach neuen wissenschaftliche 
Entdeckungen die Grundrechte und áfreiheiten des Menschen verletzt.
Auf dem Gebiet der so genannten prokreativen Freiheit, deren besonderer Aspekt, näm-
lich die Feststellung und Behandlung der Unfruchtbarkeit und beschränkten Fruchtbarkeit, 
Gegenstand dieser Erörterung ist, müssen moralische und ethische Regeln umso stärker 
als Verbündete und Wegbegleiter aller an diesen Verfahren Beteiligten fungieren. Die 
erwähnten Verfahren sind in hohem Maße speziﬁ sch, weil sie zur Geburt eines Kindes 
führen, also eines neuen menschlichen Wesens. Seine Geburt kommt nicht auf natürli-
chem Wege zustande, sondern mit Hilfe unterschiedlicher biomedizinischer Methoden. 
Der Gesetzgeber ist es, der dafür sorgen muss, diesen moralisch-ethisch und folglich auch 
rechtlich heiklen Bereich so zu regeln, dass sich der wissenschaftliche und technologische 
Fortschritt in einem positiven Beitrag zur Menschheit niederschlägt.
Das Dilemma, auf das ich in diesem Teil hinweise, bezieht sich auf die biomedizinisch 
assistierte Befruchtung. Besonders problematisch sind jene Verfahren, die die Befruchtung 
außerhalb des menschlichen Körpers ermöglichen, die so genannten IVF-Verfahren. Sie 
erhöhen den Erfolg erheblich und führen zu einer größeren Anzahl von Wunschkinderge-
**  Dr. Viktorija ÆnidarπiË Skubic, Dozentin an der Juristischen Fakultät in Ljubljana, Polj-
anski nasip 2, Ljubljana
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burten. Auf der anderen Seite werfen diese Techniken viele schwere Fragen auf: etwa wie 
viele Embryonen wir außerhalb des Mutterleibes schaffen dürfen? Müssen alle auf diese 
Weise entstandenen Embryonen in den Mutterleib implantiert werden, oder können wir 
sie für den späteren Gebrauch aufbewahren (einfrieren)? Was, wenn die Embryonen 
aus unterschiedlichen Gründen später nicht verwendet werden können? Darf man sie 
einem anderen Paar schenken oder zu Forschungszwecken verwenden, oder lassen wir sie 
sterben? Dies sind nur einige einer Vielzahl von Fragen, die der Gesetzgeber auf diesem 
Gebiet zu klären hat. In diesem Teil wird anhand eines besonderen Beispiels aus der 
englischen Rechtsprechung, das auch ein Nachspiel beim Europäischen Gerichtshof für 
Menschenrechte in Straßburg hatte, das Dilemma behandelt, was zu tun ist, wenn Part-
ner, deren Embryonen im IVF-Verfahren aufbewahrt wurden, über die Durchführung 
der medizinisch assistierten Befruchtung nicht mehr übereinstimmen. Wessen Recht 
überwiegt? Das Recht des Mannes, dessen Keimzellen für die Befruchtung außerhalb 
des Mutterleibs verwendet wurden, der das Kind nicht will und die Zustimmung zur 
Vollendung des Verfahrens beziehungsweise zur Einpﬂ anzung des aufbewahrten Embryos 
in den Körper der Frau verweigert, oder das Recht der Frau, die ein Kind will und für 
die das betreffende Verfahren die einzige Möglichkeit darstellt, eine biologische Mutter 
zu werden? Das Beispiel “Evans gegen das Vereinigte Königreich” mag vom moralisch-
ethischen Standpunkt aus vielleicht eine schwer annehmbare Lösung darstellen und ist 
doch rechtlich die einzig richtige.
Schlüsselwörter: Medizinrecht, freie Entscheidung, Kinder zu gebären, Recht auf 
Repro duktion, biomedizinisch assistierte Befruchtung, aufgeklärte Zustimmung, Widerruf 
der Zustimmung, Ehescheidung, rechtlicher und ethischer Status des Embryos.
